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S.Ct. No. 39908 
D.Ct. No. 2011-494 (Elmore) 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
COMES NOW Appellant Daniel Widner, through counsel of record Deborah Whipple, 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 118, and offers this Brief in Support of his Petition for Review. 
Review is requested because, as set out in Mr. Widner's Opening and Reply Briefs in this appeal, 
which are incorporated in full herein, the district court erred in denying Mr. Widner' s motion in 
limine to exclude evidence obtained as the result of an unconstitutional stop. 
History Of The Case 
On March 29, 2011, the state filed an information in Elmore County charging Mr. Widner 
with trafficking in marijuana and concealing a dangerous weapon within a motor vehicle. R 35-
36. Mr. Widner was arraigned on April 18, 2011. R 37-38. 
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Mr. Widner filed a motion to exclude evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional 
stop. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion in limine. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 158, 
ln. 4-p. 168, ln. 12; R 175-176. 
Thereafter, Mr. Widner entered a conditional guilty plea to both charges. Tr. 12119111. 
The district court imposed a sentence of one year fixed plus 14 indeterminate on the 
trafficking charge and 180 days concurrent on the misdemeanor. Tr. 3/21/12, p. 99, ln. 13 - p. 
100, ln. 20. 
This appeal followed. R 196-99, 235.1 
The Court of Appeals heard the case and entered a published decision affirming Mr. 
Widner's conviction on December 10, 2013. S.Ct. No. 39908. A copy of the decision is 
attached as an appendix to this brief. Mr. Widner filed a timely petition for review. 
Reasons Why Review Should Be Granted 
Review should be granted because the Court of Appeals was, for all the reasons set out in 
the Appellant's Opening and Reply Briefs, incorrect in holding that the stop of Mr. Widner, 
based upon a confidential infonnant's tip was constitutional. In particular, the informant had a 
history of giving incorrect information on several prior occasions, the informant's reports were 
based upon hearsay from an unknown source, and the hearsay declarant was not identified and 
thus, his or her reliability could not be established. Opening Brief pages 13-22; Reply Brief 
pages 1-3. 
The Court of Appeals' decision, which upheld the stop in this case, conflicts with State v. 
1 Mr. Stewart, the owner and passenger of the car unconstitutionally stopped, joined in 
the motion in limine. His appeal is currently pending before the Court of Appeals in State v. 
Stewart, No. 39887, Elmore County No. CR-2011-493. 
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Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203 (2009). Therefore, review should be granted. IAR 
118(b)(2). 
Specifically, Bishop holds that when a stop is based upon an informant's tip, a totality of 
the circumstances analysis must be made under the Fourth Amendment. In the analysis, the 
content of the tip and the informant's basis of knowledge are relevant in determining whether the 
tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion. In this case, the informant had told the police, incorrectly, 
on January 11, 2011, that he/she believed that Mr. Widner was going to California that weekend 
or the next to buy marijuana. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 21, ln. 18 - p. 22, ln. 4. On January 21, 2011, the 
CI stated that he/she had had no contact with Mr. Widner and "believed" he was probably out of 
marijuana. Tr. 10/27111, p. 22, In. 21-24. 
On January 26, 2011, the CI told police that he/she had not spoken to Mr. Widner for a 
couple of days. Later that day, the CI said that "he or she had learned that Mr. Widner was going 
to be traveling to California on that weekend." Tr. 10/27/11, p. 24, ln. 1-15. Although this tip 
was clearly based upon hearsay, possibly multiple levels of hearsay, the state did not offer any 
information whatsoever about the identity of the hearsay declarant or declarants, their basis of 
knowledge, reliability, or veracity. 
On January 29, 2011, the informant told the police that he or she had not spoken to Mr. 
Widner for a couple of days and believed he had left Mountain Home. But, again, the state did 
not present any information about the identity of the hearsay declarant or declarants who told the 
CI that Mr. Widner had left Mountain Home, their basis of knowledge, reliability or veracity. 
And, indeed, the information turned out to be incorrect. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 24, In. 14-22. 
Later on January 29, 2011, the CI informed the police that "he or she had learned that Mr. 
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Widner was planning to leave in the early morning hours of January 30 to go resupply his supply 
of marijuana" and would return that night or the early morning of the next day. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 
25, ln. 14-23. Again, this information was based upon hearsay, but again the state did not 
provide any information at all about the hearsay declarant. 
When the police attempted to verify the CI' s information, they could not - rather they saw 
that both of Mr. Widner's cars were at his house. Later that day the CI said that "he or she 
learned that Mr. Widner had traveled to California with a roommate, Alex Stewart, and that they 
were said to be in Mr. Stewart's vehicle." Tr. 10/27/11, p. 28, ln. 7-11. Again, the state offered 
no information about the hearsay declarants from whom the CI gained his or her knowledge. 
The district court and the Court of Appeals found that these tips, often incorrect, and 
based upon the hearsay of a completely unknown hearsay declarant were sufficient to support a 
stop of Mr. Stewart's car which led to the eventual arrest and charging of Mr. Widner. This 
conclusion is contrary to the Fourth Amendment and Bishop. Therefore, this Court should accept 
review of this case, find the stop unconstitutional, and reverse Mr. Widner's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this /D ::1iay of January, 2014. 
4 -BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Deborah Whipple, hereby certify that on this / 0 ~ay of January, 2014, I deposited two 
true copies of the foregoing motion in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: Lori 
Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Idaho State Attorney General, Criminal Law 
Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010. 
a~ ~JL;fL 
Deborah Whipple 
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2013 Opinion No. 65 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Filed: December 10, 2013 
v. 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
DANIEL L. WIDNER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Elmore County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge. 
Judgment of conviction and sentences for trafficking in marijuana and concealing 
a dangerous weapon in a motor vehicle, affirmed. 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant. Deborah A. 
Whipple argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 
General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. Fleming argued. 
PERRY, Judge Pro Tern 
Daniel L. Widner appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in marijuana, 
felony, Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(l)(A), (D), and concealing a dangerous weapon in a motor 
vehicle, misdemeanor, LC. § 18-3302(9), (14). Widner argues that the trial court erred by 
denying his motion in limine that sought to exclude from evidence the 2.25 pounds of marijuana 
officers found in his car. We affirm. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Detective Christopher Jessup had entered into an agreement with a confidential informant 
who was "working off' a delivery of marijuana charge with the local police. The identity of the 
1 .. ~ 
confidential informant was known to police but not disclosed at the hearing. 1 As part of their 
arrangement, Jessup and the confidential informant organized a series of controlled buys where 
the confidential informant purchased marijuana on behalf of police. The confidential informant 
identified Widner as a potential investigative target. On October 19, 2010, and on December 14, 
2010, the confidential informant purchased marijuana from Widner. 
On January 11, 2011, the informant told Jessup that Widner was planning a trip to 
California in order to purchase marijuana which he would, in tum, sell in Idaho. The informant 
believed Widner would go on the upcoming weekend or the weekend after. Jessup directed the 
informant to confirm the information and report back. The informant did not immediately report 
back. Instead, on January 21, the informant told Jessup that Widner was probably out of 
marijuana. Jessup asked the informant to attempt to gather additional information. Later, on the 
same day, the informant contacted Jessup a second time and stated that Widner was still in town, 
but planned to travel to California. The informant did not specify any particular date. 
The informant did not contact Jessup again until Wednesday, January 26. On that day, he 
informed Jessup that he had not spoken to Widner for "a couple days" but believed that Widner 
would travel to California that weekend. On Saturday, January 29, the informant once again told 
Jessup that he had not heard from Widner in a few days, but he believed Widner had left 
Mountain Home. In response, officers began conducting surveillance of Widner's home. Later 
that day, the informant called Jessup and stated that Widner was still in Mountain Home, but that 
he planned to leave early the next morning and would return later that day or the day after, 
January 31. 
On January 30, Jessup attempted to verify the information he had been provided. He 
drove by Widner's home and observed that both of Widner's vehicles were parked at the home. 
Jessup called the informant and asked him to confirm that Widner had left, and to determine 
what car he had taken. At that time, the informant did not have any new information regarding 
Widner's whereabouts nor did he know what car was being driven. However, later that day, the 
informant called Jessup and told him that Widner and his roommate, Alex Stewart, had taken 
Stewart's vehicle to California and had left that morning. 
The gender of the informant was not revealed. For the sake of convenience, we will use 
male pronouns to refer to the confidential informant. 
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From prior surveillance, Jessup was familiar with Stewart's vehicle. Jessup drove by 
Widner and Stewart's home and observed that Stewart's vehicle was not at the home, nor was his 
car at either of Stewart's places of work. After confirming that the vehicle was not in any of its 
ordinary locations, Jessup and his partner planned to intercept Widner upon his return to 
Mountain Home. They decided to wait at opposite ends of town and look for the vehicle. They 
also informed the patrol shift supervisor that they were looking for Stewart's car. 
The case was discussed at a "pass-along meeting" where officers from an earlier shift 
relate information regarding ongoing cases. The patrol shift supervisor instructed Officer Ryan 
Melanese, among others, to be on the look out for Stewart's car and provided him with the 
license plate number. At the meeting, Melanese was informed that detectives suspected 
Stewart's vehicle contained a large amount of marijuana. Accordingly, the shift supervisor told 
Melanese to develop his own probable cause before making a traffic stop, and if he could not, 
then to radio the detectives. 
On January 31, Melanese was engaged in patrol activities using a radar gun to determine 
the speed of passing vehicles. While doing so, he observed Stewart's vehicle. Melanese 
followed the vehicle for three quarters of a mile and noted that the car was travelling below the 
speed limit. Melanese became suspicious that the driver might be intoxicated, but this suspicion 
was not confirmed by weaving or erratic driving. Thereafter, Melanese observed the vehicle 
travel down a street which broadened from a one-lane road into a two-lane road. Melanese 
believed the driver was required to signal when that occurred. Likewise, the vehicle travelled 
down a street which intersected a second street and angled off to the right. The driver continued 
down the street, angling his car to the right without signaling. Melanese believed this too was a 
traffic violation. Believing he had a sufficient basis to make a stop, Melanese activated his 
overhead lights and stopped the vehicle. 
Melanese approached the vehicle to speak with Widner, who was the driver. Melanese 
observed that the driver's window was open a few inches and smelled a slight odor of marijuana 
through the open window. He then asked Widner to roll the window down further to speak with 
him. Widner said that the window was broken and could not be rolled down any further. The 
officer replied by asking Widner to open the door. Widner complied with the request and when 
he did so, the officer smelled a heavy odor of marijuana. 
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After the door was opened, the officer also requested that both Widner and Stewart 
produce identification. After receiving the identification, Melanese asked dispatch to run records 
checks on Widner and Stewart. Dispatch indicated that neither had any active warrants so 
Melanese returned to the car and ordered Widner out of the car. Melanese asked Widner if he 
had smoked marijuana and Widner denied doing so. Melanese began to observe Widner for 
other signs of impairment. He noted that Widner was shaking. Given the weather, the officer 
believed the shaking could be caused by the cold and asked Widner if he wanted his jacket from 
inside the car. Widner said that he wanted the jacket, but only if he could retrieve it himself. In 
response, Melanese offered to retrieve the jacket for Widner. Widner declined the offer and 
admitted that there was a small plastic bag containing marijuana in his jacket pocket. Thereafter, 
Widner was permitted to get his jacket from inside the vehicle and he turned over the marijuana. 
Then, Widner was handcuffed and placed into a patrol car. 
Thereafter, another officer arrived on scene with a drug detection dog. That officer took 
the dog around the car and the dog alerted, indicating the presence of drugs. After the alert, the 
officers searched the car and found 2.25 pounds of marijuana in boxes in the backseat of the 
vehicle. 
Widner was charged with trafficking in marijuana, felony, Idaho Code § 37-
2732B(a)(l)(A), (D), and concealing a dangerous weapon in a motor vehicle, misdemeanor, I.C. 
§ 18-3302(9), (14). Widner entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the 
validity of the traffic stop. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Widner's sole claim is that the police lacked reasonable and articulable 
suspicion to stop him. In the district court, the State offered two bases upon which the stop was 
justified. The first basis was the alleged traffic infractions, i.e., the two times Officer Melanese 
believed Widner was required to signal. The trial court ruled that neither of the alleged traffic 
infractions violated the law. The State does not challenge this determination on appeal. 
Therefore, on appeal, the issue is whether the alternative basis for the stop, suspicion founded on 
reports by the confidential informant, was a sufficient basis for the stop. Widner argues that the 
confidential informant's tips did not create reasonable and articulable suspicion. 
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Although the original motion was entitled a motion in limine, the parties and the trial 
judge treated this motion as a motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, we treat this motion as 
a suppression motion. The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a suppression motion is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that 
are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. 
App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. 
Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 
789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates 
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the 
Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop must be supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
the vehicle is being driven contrary to the traffic laws or that either the vehicle or an occupant is 
subject to detention in connection with violation of other laws. State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 
734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003). Whether the officer had the requisite reasonable 
suspicion to detain a citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, i.e., 
the collective knowledge of all those officers and dispatchers involved. Wilson v. Idaho Transp. 
Dep 't, 136 Idaho 270, 276, 32 P.3d 164, 170 (Ct. App. 2001). The reasonable suspicion standard 
requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the 
officer. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 4 7 4, 483, 988 P .2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). 
In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the Supreme Court adopted a totality of the 
circumstances test to determine if an informant's tip creates reasonable and articulable suspicion 
to support a traffic stop. The Court also held that certain factors used in a prior, abandoned 
"two-prong test" were still relevant when performing a totality of the circumstances test. Id. at 
328-29. The relevant factors include "an informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and 'basis of 
knowledge.'" Id. The Idaho Supreme Court adopted White in State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 
811-12, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210-11 (2009). It also set forth a broader list of factors which indicate 
that a tip is reliable: 
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Factors indicative of reliability include whether the informant reveals his or her 
identity and the basis of his or her knowledge, whether the location of the 
informant is known, whether the information was based on first-hand 
observations of events as they were occurring, whether the information the 
informant provided was subject to immediate confirmation or corroboration by 
police, whether the informant has previously provided reliable information, 
whether the informant provides predictive information, and whether the informant 
could be held criminally liable if the report were discovered to be false. 
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211. 
Widner concedes that this is the appropriate test, but argues that the tip did not create 
reasonable and articulable suspicion because (1) the confidential informant gave officers 
incorrect information on several occasions; (2) the informant's reports were based upon hearsay; 
and (3) the hearsay declarant was not identified and thus, his or her reliability cannot be 
established. These arguments focus on two particular Bishop factors: the reliability of the 
reports the informant previously provided to police and the informant's basis of knowledge. 
The trial court ruled that Melanese had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop 
Widner based upon the collective knowledge doctrine, the informant's reports, and the officers' 
verification of those reports. Widner argues that the report on January 11 and the first report on 
January 29 demonstrate that the trial court's ruling was erroneous because these reports show 
that the informant provided unreliable information. 
The trial court did not find that the informant's reports on January 11 or January 29 
rendered him unreliable. We conclude that the trial court's determination was supported by the 
evidence because the record shows that the informant had previously provided reliable 
information. The confidential informant reported that Widner sold marijuana and this was 
confirmed by two controlled buys. Likewise, the informant's January 30 report that Stewart and 
Widner had travelled in Stewart's car was confirmed when police looked for Stewart's car and 
could not find it in Mountain Home. Finally, the informant's second report on January 29 
indicated that Widner had left town and would return either late on January 30 or early on 
January 31. This report was confirmed by police when they observed Stewart's car coming into 
town on the morning of January 31. The accuracy of these reports is substantial evidence 
supporting a determination that the informant had previously provided reliable information. 
Conversely, the two occasions Widner cites as evidence of unreliability are not 
persuasive. On January 11, the informant reported that Widner was planning on leaving that 
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weekend or the weekend after. The fact that Widner did not travel to California on either 
weekend is not persuasive evidence of unreliability. First, courts "have never required that 
informants used by the police be infallible" in order for them to be found reliable. Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 n.14 (1983). Second, people can and do change indefinite or inchoate 
plans. From the record, it appears that any plan, as described by the informant, was an indefinite 
plan because Widner had not determined when exactly he would travel. 
Widner also argues that the informant's report on January 29 indicating that he believed 
Widner was out of town renders the informant unreliable because Widner did not leave town on 
that day. Once again, we do not conclude that this warrants a determination that the informant 
was unreliable. First, the informant phrased his tip as mere belief and also indicated that he had 
not spoken to Widner in days. Second, the informant was able to provide updated information 
on the same day and this new information was confirmed by police. Because there is substantial 
evidence that the informant was reliable and because the examples Widner cites as evidence of 
unreliability are not persuasive, we conclude that this Bishop factor was met; the informant had 
previously provided reliable reports. 
Turning to the other Bishop factor Widner focuses on, he argues the tip was not reliable 
because the State failed to show the informant's basis of knowledge. The record shows that the 
informant's basis of knowledge was not set forth at the hearing. However, this does not render 
the informant unreliable. In Bishop, the Idaho Supreme Court observed that the defendant failed 
to present any "authority to support the proposition that a citizen-informant's tip should be 
reclassified as anonymous based solely on his or her basis of knowledge." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 
813, 203 P.3d at 1212. Widner cites to United States v. Monteiro, 447 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2006) for 
the proposition that "when a tip [is] based upon hearsay from an unknown source, it is akin to an 
anonymous tip." However, Monteiro does not support this contention. Monteiro stands for the 
proposition that a tip is not reliable when it relies upon hearsay from an unknown source, where 
both the informant and the unknown source have significant incentives to fabricate their reports 
because they are biased against the defendant, and where the substance of that tip has been 
undermined because "an initial police investigation into a tip of illegal activity reveals factors 
inconsistent with the tip." Id at 45-47. The facts in Monteiro are distinguishable from the facts 
in this case. In particular, no evidence was presented to show that the informant was biased 
against Widner or that police found facts which undermined the substance of the tip. Finally, in 
7 
Bishop, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the import of the fact that a tipster's knowledge is 
based upon hearsay. The Court held: 
[T]he fact that a tip is based on hearsay information is only a factor to consider in 
determining whether a stop was justified--it is not an absolute bar to a finding of 
reasonable suspicion. However, the original hearsay declarant's basis of 
knowledge, reliability, and veracity are also factors under the totality of the 
circumstances analysis. 
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 813-14, 203 P.3d at 1212-13 (citations omitted). 
In addressing the other Bishop factors, we conclude there is substantial evidence 
supporting the district court's determination that the tip was reliable. The identity and location 
of the informant were known to police who maintained frequent contact with him. Moreover, as 
a result of his agreement with police, he was subject to criminal liability if he provided false 
information to police officers. Furthermore, the informant's definitive statements were 
confirmed by the police investigation. The informant indicated that Widner had left town, 
travelled in his roommate's vehicle, and was taking a trip of a certain duration. Police observed 
that Stewart's car was not parked in any of the usual locations after the informant indicated it 
would be gone. Later, the police observed the car coming into town from a direction consistent 
with out-of-town travel and at the predicted time. 
Finally, while the precise basis of the informant's knowledge was not set forth, the 
evidence shows the informant knew significant facts about Widner' s drug operation. He knew 
Widner sold marijuana as evidenced by the two controlled buys. He also knew approximately 
how much inventory Widner had at any point in time. Furthermore, he had information 
regarding Widner's supplier and the manner in which the supplier would provide Widner with 
drugs. 
Additionally, the evidence shows that the informant had direct or indirect access to 
Widner himself. Many of the tips reflect Widner's plans to travel on certain days, at certain 
times, with certain people, in a certain car, to a certain place. For a third party to know of these 
plans Widner must have communicated them, directly or indirectly, to the informant. These tips 
could not result from mere observation of Widner because Widner's planning is not an 
observable fact. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the informant told police on 
several occasions that he had not spoken to Widner recently but, on at least two occasions, was 
able to update police in response to further police inquiries. On both occasions, the updates were 
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given on the same day as the request for an update. Accordingly, while the precise details about 
the informant's source of knowledge are unknown, the record shows that the informant had 
ready access to significant details regarding Widner' s operation and that Widner himself was 
either the direct or indirect source of that information. 
In White, the Supreme Court held that similar factors, along with corroboration, rendered 
an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable to justify a stop. White, 496 U.S. at 332. In that case, the 
witness predicted future behavior which made clear that the informant was "privy to [the 
defendant's] itinerary" and the Court reasoned that such a person was "likely to also have access 
to reliable information about that individual's illegal activities." Id. The corroborated report of 
the known informant here, conveying similar information, constitutes reasonable and articulable 
suspicion for the stop of the automobile. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that under the totality of the circumstances, the information from the informant 
was reliable. Because it was reliable, there was reasonable suspicion for officers to perform a 
traffic stop. We affirm Widner's judgment of conviction. 
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR. 
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